{"id":25323,"date":"2025-06-30T11:17:26","date_gmt":"2025-06-30T09:17:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/?p=25323"},"modified":"2025-06-30T11:17:26","modified_gmt":"2025-06-30T09:17:26","slug":"israeli-military-bases-in-the-horn-of-africa-strategy-of-influence-and-redrawing-power-balances-in-the-red-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/en\/israeli-military-bases-in-the-horn-of-africa-strategy-of-influence-and-redrawing-power-balances-in-the-red-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Israeli Military Bases in the Horn of Africa: Strategy of Influence and Redrawing Power Balances in the Red Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><strong>By: Dina Lamloum<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Coordinator of African Affairs Unit<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel\u2019s interest in the African continent extends beyond geopolitical objectives and interests to include military aims, primarily to expand its sphere of influence and dominance in the Red Sea region and to deter any current or future aggression. Israel thus seeks to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa, despite already possessing a military base in Eritrea. The choice may also fall on Somaliland, which is actively seeking international recognition, with Ethiopia potentially serving as a partner in this phase\u2014especially following Ethiopia\u2019s agreement with Somaliland to access the Red Sea. This context explains the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister to Ethiopia in May, under the pretext of strengthening bilateral relations, security cooperation, and counterterrorism. However, Israel\u2019s moves may be independent of Addis Ababa, and such activities will impact the security and stability of the region, given the long history of violations and disregard for international and humanitarian law by both Ethiopia and Israel.<\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Israeli\u2019s Base in Eritrea<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israeli-Eritrean cooperation dates back to the mid-1990s, evolving into a strategic alliance aimed at making Asmara a pivotal ally in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Israel established a military base on the Dahlak Archipelago, located 43 km from the Eritrean coast and 135 km from the capital. This is Israel\u2019s second-largest naval base outside its borders and one of the most advanced intelligence centers in the Horn of Africa and the Bab al-Mandab region, overlooking the Red Sea\u2014one of the world\u2019s most vital maritime arteries.<\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel utilizes surveillance towers atop the islands\u2019 mountains to gather intelligence on military activities in the Red Sea and neighboring countries, relaying this information to the Israeli Air Force for targeting military zones around the archipelago. The base also serves to monitor Iranian movements in the region and secure Israeli maritime trade. Israel has launched military operations toward Sudan from this base, under the pretext of Sudanese support for Hamas. Additionally, Israeli naval units off the Dahlak base were used to launch attacks on Lebanon during the July 2006 war and to fire rockets at Hezbollah positions.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a><\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-25324 size-large\" src=\"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-1024x723.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"723\" srcset=\"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-1024x723.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-300x212.jpg 300w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-150x106.jpg 150w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-768x542.jpg 768w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-850x600.jpg 850w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base-600x423.jpg 600w, https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Dahlak-Base.jpg 1070w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/strong><\/h3>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Dahlak Base<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Expanded Israeli Military Movements in the Horn of Africa<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\">Despite possessing a base in Eritrea, Israel continues to seek military footholds in other Horn of Africa countries for several strategic reasons:<\/h3>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>1- Enhancing Deployment and Diversifying Options<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Relying on a single base or country exposes Israel to risks in case of political or security changes, as occurred when Israeli forces at the Dahlak base were attacked in late 2023. Therefore, Israel aims to diversify its military and intelligence dependencies to mitigate risks and expand its operational reach.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>2- Expanding Regional Influence<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Presence in multiple Horn of Africa countries allows Israel greater capacity to monitor maritime routes, Iranian and Turkish movements, arms smuggling, and activities of groups like Yemen\u2019s Ansar Allah (Houthis), thereby expanding its influence in a strategically vital region.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>3- Securing Israeli Interests in the Red Sea<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">The Red Sea is a crucial maritime passage for Israel. Multiple bases and centers enable Israel to better protect its interests and ensure they are not threatened by any regional actor.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>4- Countering Threats and International Competition<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Multiple military bases empower Israel to counter regional and international rivals, such as Iran and Turkey, and to exert greater influence over the security dynamics of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a><\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Israeli Plans for Access to the Red Sea<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel may employ several tools to strengthen its presence in the Red Sea, either by supporting Ethiopia in acquiring a base in Somaliland and leveraging Addis Ababa\u2019s advantages or by directly recognizing Somaliland and establishing a base there. This would allow Israel to encircle the Houthis and influence the Red Sea\u2019s security equation:<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>1- Strengthening Israeli-Ethiopian Rapprochement<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left;\">\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Security and Intelligence Cooperation:<\/strong><\/h4>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel and Ethiopia maintain close security relations. In November 2020, the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service signed an agreement with Israel\u2019s Mossad to enhance intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation in the Horn of Africa, including information exchange and capacity building. In 2021, security agencies in both countries arrested 16 suspects in Addis Ababa planning attacks on the UAE embassies in Ethiopia and Sudan. Military cooperation has expanded in recent years, including cyber and intelligence domains, with Israel providing military support, training, and equipment to Ethiopia.<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">On May 5, the Israeli Foreign Minister, accompanied by a high-level trade delegation, visited Addis Ababa. The delegation included representatives from Israeli companies in strategic sectors such as agriculture, water and climate technologies, renewable energy, innovation, and medical devices. This visit reflects strategic dimensions amid regional tensions and intersecting Israeli-Ethiopian interests, especially concerning the Red Sea.<\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Given repeated Houthi attacks on Israel, the visit may have aimed at logistical arrangements, intelligence support, and joint coordination in the Red Sea to secure Israel\u2019s vital maritime routes through defense cooperation with key regional states, notably Ethiopia, which continues to seek Red Sea access.<a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a><\/h4>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left;\">\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Israeli-Ethiopian Security Coordination on Red Sea Navigation:<\/strong><\/h4>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Amid regional developments, including the recent Israel-Iran war, Israel is particularly interested in Ethiopia\u2019s quest for a Red Sea base\u2014a goal shared by Israel to secure itself from Houthi attacks and enhance its presence in this geostrategic area. Thus, Israeli-Ethiopian security coordination on Red Sea navigation is likely, with Israel supporting Ethiopia\u2019s maritime ambitions, either directly or indirectly, through implicit alliances with Somaliland.<\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">This arrangement would benefit both: Ethiopia would realize its long-held maritime dream, and Israel would cement its presence in the region. However, this poses significant risks to regional security, especially for Egypt, which would face two adversaries at the southern gate of the Suez Canal, threatening its security and providing leverage in various files\u2014not only for Cairo but regionally\u2014given both countries\u2019 history of circumventing international norms.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>2- Opening Up to Somaliland<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left;\">\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Israeli Base in Somaliland in Exchange for Recognition:<\/strong><\/h4>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Since its 1990 declaration of independence from Somalia, Somaliland has sought international recognition, viewing strategic partnerships as a path to this goal. In January 2024, Somaliland signed an agreement with Ethiopia, and by the end of the year, reports indicated that Israel was negotiating with Somaliland to establish a military base in exchange for recognition. Diplomatic sources confirm ongoing talks, and given Somaliland\u2019s eagerness for recognition, acceptance of an Israeli base is plausible, potentially with a third-party mediator.<a href=\"#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a><\/h4>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left;\">\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Israeli Recognition of Somaliland:<\/strong><\/h4>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Should Israel recognize Somaliland, the latter could become a player in international and regional circles. Recently, Hargeisa\u2019s government has pursued recognition at any cost, as evidenced by the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, which would allow Ethiopia to establish a Red Sea base via Somaliland in exchange for formal recognition. While the agreement has not materialized, arrangements may be underway in secret, possibly with Israel as a mediator, especially given the Red Sea\u2019s strategic importance and recent tensions.<\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Thus, Israeli recognition of Somaliland may occur in exchange for Red Sea access, either directly or by encouraging other states, such as Ethiopia, to do so, with Israel providing the necessary support and cover for Addis Ababa to act despite international opposition. Israel may also provide financial and logistical support for the base, which Ethiopia cannot afford alone amid economic decline and internal crises. Alternatively, Israel may not immediately recognize Somaliland, but with ongoing regional changes and Hargeisa\u2019s insistence, such recognition is increasingly likely.<\/h4>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left;\">\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Reasons for Choosing Somaliland:<\/strong><\/h4>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Somaliland enjoys a strategic location at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Aden, on the Bab al-Mandab Strait\u2014one of the world\u2019s busiest trade routes\u2014overlooking the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It is situated in northwestern Somalia, bordered by Ethiopia to the south and west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, and Puntland to the east. Israeli presence here would mean penetration of the entire Horn of Africa and containment of the Houthis, Israel\u2019s primary current objective due to increased Houthi attacks. Somaliland\u2019s proximity\u2014less than 400 miles from Yemen\u2019s Hodeidah port\u2014makes it a strategic point for monitoring Red Sea navigation and shortening the distance for Israeli strikes against the Houthis.<\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Geopolitical Implications:<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">If Israel succeeds in establishing a military base in Hargeisa, it would deepen its penetration of the Horn of Africa, posing a broader threat in an already volatile region. Recognition of Somaliland could revive normalization with Israel, encouraging other secessionist entities to follow suit, thereby threatening regional security and stability and disrupting the security dynamics of the Red Sea and the Arab world.<a href=\"#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a> Regional actors must therefore intensify diplomatic efforts to counter Israeli encroachment.<\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Possible Scenarios<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel seeks to bolster its presence and secure strategic access to the Red Sea, either via Somaliland, by supporting Ethiopia, or by maintaining and upgrading its Eritrean base. The scenarios are as follows:<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>Scenario 1: Establishing a Base in Somaliland<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Given ongoing secret negotiations between Israel and Somaliland regarding a base in Hargeisa, Somaliland\u2019s quest for recognition, and repeated Houthi attacks, Israel may intensify efforts to secure a Red Sea foothold, leveraging Somaliland\u2019s desire for recognition. This scenario gains importance amid escalating Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, prompting Israel to seek intelligence and military outposts to monitor Houthi and Iranian activities. However, its feasibility depends on international recognition of Somaliland and regional\/international responses, but it remains the most likely in the current context.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>Scenario 2: Accessing the Sea via Ethiopia<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel may face pressures to avoid a new crisis amid its conflict with Iran and may thus deepen strategic ties with Ethiopia\u2014a key gateway to Africa and the Red Sea\u2014to secure a new foothold without traversing Iranian or Houthi-controlled areas. With rising Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions over maritime access, Israel could exploit regional rivalries to support Ethiopian moves or enhance bilateral cooperation in security, intelligence, and infrastructure. This scenario would give Israel greater maneuverability in the Red Sea while reducing direct involvement in new conflicts, making it relatively likely.<\/h4>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong>Scenario 3: Reinforcing the Dahlak Base<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">If alternatives prove unfeasible, Israel may focus on reinforcing and expanding its military and intelligence presence at the Dahlak base\u2014its strategic Red Sea outpost\u2014by upgrading infrastructure, increasing readiness, deploying additional naval and air units, and intensifying patrols to respond swiftly to threats. In this case, Israel would also enhance political and security ties with Eritrea to ensure the base\u2019s security, making this scenario probable if other options fail.<\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Israel pursues long-term diplomacy in its various files. In response to repeated Houthi attacks, it has sought a Red Sea foothold, guided by the scenarios outlined above. Israel may eventually recognize Somaliland, reinforce its Dahlak presence, or intensify cooperation with Addis Ababa. All these options pose significant risks, constituting a direct threat to the security and stability of the Horn of Africa and the broader region, especially given Israel\u2019s record of evading international law. Ethiopia\u2019s policies are similarly problematic, raising serious concerns about escalating regional tensions and conflicts.<\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\">Given these dynamics, there is an urgent need for enhanced coordination among regional states and African countries to develop effective mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the Red Sea by actors seeking strategic gains at the expense of collective security. This requires strengthening preventive diplomacy, developing security capacities, and opening comprehensive regional dialogue channels to ensure respect for national sovereignty and maintain regional balance. Failure by the international and regional community to address this challenge could destabilize the area and trigger military escalation with far-reaching consequences.<\/h4>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"color: #993300;\"><strong>References<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> \u0642\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u062f\u0647\u0644\u0643 \u0628\u0625\u0631\u064a\u062a\u0631\u064a\u0627 \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644\u064a \u0644\u0645\u0631\u0627\u0642\u0628\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u062d\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062d\u0645\u0631\u060c \u0627\u0644\u062c\u0632\u064a\u0631\u0629\u060c \u064a\u0648\u0644\u064a\u0648 2025\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/txpz4s\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/txpz4s<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> \u062d\u0628\u064a\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u062f\u0648\u064a\u060c \u0639\u064a\u0646 \u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0627\u0633\u062a\u0631\u0627\u062a\u064a\u062c\u064a\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0628\u062d\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062d\u0645\u0631\u060c \u0623\u064a\u0648\u0628 \u0646\u064a\u0648\u0632\u060c \u0646\u0648\u0641\u0645\u0628\u0631 2023\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/3sbrl\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/3sbrl<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> \u0647\u062c\u0648\u0645 \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0642\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u201c\u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644\u064a\u0629\u201d \u0641\u064a \u0625\u0631\u064a\u062a\u0631\u064a\u0627\u060c \u0648\u0643\u0627\u0644\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0642\u062f\u0633 \u0644\u0644\u0623\u0646\u0628\u0627\u0621\u060c \u0623\u0643\u062a\u0648\u0628\u0631 2023\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/4nt4a\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/4nt4a<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> \u0639\u0628\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0627\u062f\u0631 \u0645\u062d\u0645\u062f \u0639\u0644\u064a\u060c \u0647\u0644 \u062a\u0646\u062c\u062d \u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644 \u0641\u064a \u062c\u0631 \u0625\u062b\u064a\u0648\u0628\u064a\u0627 \u0644\u0645\u0648\u0627\u062c\u0647\u0629 \u0645\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0648\u062b\u064a\u064a\u0646\u061f\u060c \u0627\u0644\u062c\u0632\u064a\u0631\u0629\u060c 10 \u0645\u0627\u064a\u0648 2025\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/020rvq\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/020rvq<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\">[5]<\/a> \u0639\u0628\u064a\u0631 \u0645\u062c\u062f\u064a\u060c \u062a\u0631\u062a\u064a\u0628\u0627\u062a \u062b\u0646\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0629: \u0645\u0627\u0630\u0627 \u062a\u0631\u064a\u062f \u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644 \u0645\u0646 \u0625\u062b\u064a\u0648\u0628\u064a\u0627 \u0628\u0639\u062f \u0632\u064a\u0627\u0631\u0629 \u201c\u062c\u062f\u0639\u0648\u0646 \u0633\u0627\u0639\u0631\u201d\u061f\u060c \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0631\u0639 \u0644\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0633\u062a\u0631\u0627\u062a\u064a\u062c\u064a\u0629\u060c 7 \u0645\u0627\u064a\u0648 2025\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/rcssegypt.com\/21158\">https:\/\/rcssegypt.com\/21158<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\"><\/a>\u00a0[6]\u00a0 \u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644 \u062a\u0628\u062d\u062b \u0639\u0646 \u0642\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0639\u0633\u0643\u0631\u064a\u0629 \u0642\u0628\u0627\u0644\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u064a\u0645\u0646\u060c \u0627\u0644\u0634\u0631\u0642 \u0644\u0644\u0623\u062e\u0628\u0627\u0631\u060c \u064a\u0648\u0646\u064a\u0648 2025\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/u8858\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/u8858<\/a><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: left;\"><a href=\"#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> \u062b\u0627\u0628\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0645\u0648\u0631\u060c &#8220;\u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644&#8221; \u0648\u0641\u0631\u0635 \u0625\u0642\u0627\u0645\u0629 \u0642\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0639\u0633\u0643\u0631\u064a\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0623\u0631\u0636 \u0627\u0644\u0635\u0648\u0645\u0627\u0644\u061f\u060c \u0627\u0644\u0645\u064a\u0627\u062f\u064a\u0646\u060c \u0623\u0643\u062a\u0648\u0628\u0631 2024\u060c \u0645\u062a\u0627\u062d \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u0627\u0644\u0622\u062a\u064a: <a href=\"https:\/\/n9.cl\/sh4s11\">https:\/\/n9.cl\/sh4s11<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By: Dina Lamloum Coordinator of African Affairs Unit Introduction Israel\u2019s interest in the African continent extends beyond geopolitical objectives and interests to include military aims, primarily to expand its sphere of influence and dominance in the Red Sea region and to deter any current or future aggression. Israel thus seeks to establish military bases in [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[100,97,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-25323","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-african-studies-unit","category-reports","category-research-papers-african","pmpro-has-access"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v25.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Israeli Military Bases in the Horn of Africa: Strategy of Influence and Redrawing Power Balances in the Red Sea - \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0634\u0627\u0641 \u0644\u062a\u062d\u0644\u064a\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0633\u062a\u0642\u0628\u0644\u064a\u0629<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/en\/israeli-military-bases-in-the-horn-of-africa-strategy-of-influence-and-redrawing-power-balances-in-the-red-sea\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Israeli Military Bases in the Horn of Africa: Strategy of Influence and Redrawing Power Balances in the Red Sea - \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0634\u0627\u0641 \u0644\u062a\u062d\u0644\u064a\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0633\u062a\u0642\u0628\u0644\u064a\u0629\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By: Dina Lamloum Coordinator of African Affairs Unit Introduction Israel\u2019s interest in the African continent extends beyond geopolitical objectives and interests to include military aims, primarily to expand its sphere of influence and dominance in the Red Sea region and to deter any current or future aggression. 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military aims, primarily to expand its sphere of influence and dominance in the Red Sea region and to deter any current or future aggression. Israel thus seeks to establish military bases in [&hellip;]","og_url":"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/en\/israeli-military-bases-in-the-horn-of-africa-strategy-of-influence-and-redrawing-power-balances-in-the-red-sea\/","og_site_name":"\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0634\u0627\u0641 \u0644\u062a\u062d\u0644\u064a\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0633\u062a\u0642\u0628\u0644\u064a\u0629","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/shaf.center","article_published_time":"2025-06-30T09:17:26+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1040,"height":585,"url":"https:\/\/shafcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-06-29-at-4.16.23-PM-1.jpeg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Maram Akram","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@CenterShaf","twitter_site":"@CenterShaf","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Maram Akram","Est. reading time":"16 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