{"id":24801,"date":"2025-05-20T10:11:32","date_gmt":"2025-05-20T08:11:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/?p=24801"},"modified":"2025-05-20T10:11:32","modified_gmt":"2025-05-20T08:11:32","slug":"washingtons-strategy-in-the-horn-of-africa-a-potential-recognition-of-somaliland-in-exchange-for-a-military-foothold","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shaf-back.imholding.co.uk\/en\/washingtons-strategy-in-the-horn-of-africa-a-potential-recognition-of-somaliland-in-exchange-for-a-military-foothold\/","title":{"rendered":"Washington’s Strategy in the Horn of Africa: A Potential Recognition of Somaliland in Exchange for a Military Foothold"},"content":{"rendered":"

Prepared by: Menna Salah<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Researcher at the African Affairs Unit<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Amid the rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland is emerging as a political actor striving to redefine its position on the international stage. This comes as American Republican elites show growing interest in the region and engage in discussions over the possibility of recognition in exchange for strategic advantages. These developments are unfolding within a broader context of global power competition, as Washington seeks to bolster its influence in a vital region overlooking key maritime corridors and bordering Chinese influence in Djibouti. In this context, a reciprocal scenario appears to be taking shape\u2014one in which the United States could secure a military foothold at the Port of Berbera in exchange for diplomatic support for Somaliland. Such a move could mark a turning point in Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition.<\/h4>\n

The Historical Roots of U.S.\u2013Somaliland Relations<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The relationship between the United States and Somaliland has been characterized by a history of strategic cooperation, despite the absence of official recognition. Shared interests in areas such as security and democratic governance have provided a foundation for friendly relations between the two sides. In the early years, Somaliland\u2019s first two presidents, Abdirahman Ali Tuur and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, focused primarily on internal state-building. Although Egal visited the United States in 1998, bilateral relations remained limited in scope and influence.<\/h4>\n

This dynamic began to shift in the aftermath of the U.S.-led War on Terror, when Somaliland, under the leadership of President Dahir Riyale Kahin, positioned itself as a partner to the United States and Ethiopia in combating terrorist organizations. In January 2008, Riyale conducted a significant visit to Washington, where he met with senior officials from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Council. Discussions during the visit focused on cooperation in security, development, and democracy.<\/h4>\n

Subsequently, Somaliland hosted a delegation of U.S. congressional staffers, including members from influential committees, who toured the strategic Port of Berbera. Later, President Muse Bihi Abdi visited Washington, where he presented Somaliland\u2019s vision as a stable democratic partner. This visit encouraged some U.S. lawmakers to introduce the “Somaliland Partnership Act,” aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation. Additionally, the city of Hargeisa received visits from prominent figures such as Peter Pham and Tibor Nagy, both of whom advocated for deepening U.S. engagement with Somaliland[1]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/h4>\n

During the First Trump Administration (2017\u20132021)<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Somaliland experienced unprecedented acceptance from the United States during President Donald Trump\u2019s first term. Several U.S. officials responsible for African affairs supported the idea of recognizing Somaliland. At the same time, Somaliland successfully built a support base within the Republican Party, both in Congress and among conservative policy institutions close to the president. While Trump officially upheld the “One Somalia” policy, his National Security Council notably supported Taiwan\u2019s recognition of Somaliland. Moreover, Trump\u2019s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia was interpreted by many in Somaliland as a potential shift in Washington\u2019s Somalia policy doctrine.<\/h4>\n

Under the Biden Administration (2021\u20132025)<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

U.S.\u2013Somaliland relations continued to progress under President Joe Biden\u2019s administration. An official delegation from Somaliland visited Washington and met with congressional and administration officials. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included provisions to enhance cooperation with Somaliland. In 2022, several senior U.S. officials\u2014including the commander of U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. ambassador to Somalia\u2014visited Hargeisa. Despite these positive signs, many in Somaliland grew increasingly frustrated with the Democrats, as the Biden administration maintained its support for the Federal Government of Somalia, redeployed U.S. troops to Somalia, excluded Somaliland representatives from key diplomatic summits, and publicly criticized its government[2]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/h4>\n

The Second Trump Administration (2025\u2013Present)<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

In his second term, President Donald Trump has shown a clear interest in Somaliland. Talks have taken place between regional officials and the Trump administration to reach an agreement that would lease the Port of Berbera and its nearby airstrip to the United States in exchange for official recognition of Somaliland\u2019s independence. Somaliland authorities view the Trump administration\u2019s conservative economic and political orientation as a unique opportunity to achieve their long-standing goal of international recognition. This policy shift comes amid rising regional tensions and growing Chinese influence across Africa, prompting the Trump administration to consider strengthening its presence in the Horn of Africa through new partnerships\u2014especially with entities like Somaliland, which have demonstrated clear support for U.S. interests and opposition to Chinese dominance[3]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/h4>\n

The Legal and Historical Basis for Somaliland\u2019s Pursuit of International Recognition<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Somaliland grounds its claim for international recognition on clear legal and historical arguments. Formerly a British protectorate, it was granted sovereign status by the United Kingdom on June 26, 1960, prior to entering into a union with Somalia\u2014a union that was never ratified by the Somali parliament. Following the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991 and the disintegration of the central government, Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence on May 18 of the same year.<\/h4>\n

The roots of this trajectory lie in the Somali National Movement (SNM), one of the major clan-based rebel movements that played a key role in toppling the central government. The movement faced brutal repression by the Somali regime, including mass killings in the north between 1987 and 1989. After the fall of the regime, violent power struggles erupted among various militias. Relative calm only returned with the emergence of politician Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, who consolidated his authority through alliances with merchants and business leaders and was later elected president of Somaliland in 1993. Since then, Somaliland\u2019s political leadership has continued to strengthen stability and build state institutions[4]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/h4>\n

On the regional and international levels, Somaliland received de facto recognition from the African Union in 2005, which further supports its legal claim to statehood. Somaliland maintains that recognition by the United States would be consistent with international principles\u2014particularly the right to self-determination and respect for sovereignty\u2014and would affirm the existence of a stable, democratic state committed to peace and regional cooperation.<\/h4>\n

The Approach of the Somaliland Government in Hargeisa to Securing International Recognition<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Successive governments in Somaliland have adopted an informal diplomatic approach in their pursuit of international recognition of sovereignty. This strategy has primarily focused on building strategic alliances with Western powers\u2014particularly the United States, as the dominant global force after the Cold War, and the United Kingdom, as the former colonial power. This orientation is reinforced by the presence of large Somaliland diaspora communities in both countries, which contribute to strengthening political and social ties between Hargeisa and Western capitals.<\/h4>\n

Although the United States and the United Kingdom have long viewed Somaliland as a strategic partner, they have repeatedly hesitated to extend official recognition. Both countries have favored a policy of empowering the internationally recognized Federal Government in Mogadishu to restore full control over Somali territory. However, this policy has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, particularly given the ongoing security challenges in Mogadishu, in contrast to Somaliland’s demonstrated ability to maintain political and security stability and conduct regular elections, despite facing both political and armed opposition.<\/h4>\n

As global power dynamics shift and new international actors rise, Somaliland\u2019s leadership has pursued a more diversified foreign policy aimed at achieving a singular goal: international recognition. Today, the capital, Hargeisa, hosts representative offices and consulates of several countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union\u2014highlighting the government’s success in building an expanding network of foreign relations.<\/h4>\n

Somaliland has also developed unofficial ties with the United Arab Emirates, a key trading partner that hosts a large number of Somaliland migrants and serves as a primary destination for the region’s livestock exports. As part of its expanding diplomatic outreach, the government in Hargeisa has established representative offices in several countries, including Canada, the United States, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Taiwan. Notably, Somaliland\u2019s close relationship with Taiwan\u2014established in 2020\u2014has drawn strong objections from China, which regards Taiwan as a part of its territory. This has added a symbolic and diplomatic dimension to Somaliland’s foreign policy, positioning it within broader geopolitical tensions.<\/h4>\n

In a significant and provocative move, Somaliland\u2019s outgoing President Muse Bihi signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 1, 2024, aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation. Bihi stated that Ethiopia would become the first country to officially recognize Somaliland. This development triggered serious tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. However, Abiy later softened his position after reaching a reconciliation with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, brokered by Turkey[5]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/h4>\n

U.S. Objectives and Interests in Recognizing Somaliland<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n